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AN INTERSTATE CIRCUIT APPROACH TO THE REFUSAL
TO DEAL DILEMMA UNDER SECTION 3 OF
THE CLAYTON ACT*
MIANUFACTURERS often desire to market their products through exclusive
dealerships.' Under such an arrangement, the manufacturer is able to demand
loyalty from his sales outlets, to lower sales costs, and to provide efficient
servicing for the consumer.2 However, a network of these dealerships restricts
competition on two levels of enterprise: competing manufacturers are fore-
closed from the use of desirable outlets, and dealers are denied the freedom
to handle the products of other manufacturers.3 Moreover, if the dealership
is granted in conjunction with an exclusive territorial agency,4 competing
outlets within the exclusive area are denied access to the manufacturer's
product, and retail price competition within the industry may be severely
restricted.5
The threat to competition inherent in the use of exclusive dealer contracts
led Congress to enact Section 3 of the Clayton Act which prohibits such
*Leo J. Mleyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 75 S. Ct. 113 (1954) ; Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F2d 911
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
1. "An exclusive dealership arrangement . . . is one in which a supplier secures
exclusive marketing outlets by arranging with dealers to handle its products to the ex-
clusion of all competing products... ." Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevanc of Economic
Factors in Determining Wihether Excltzsic ..Irrangements Vi'olate Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 65 H.Aav. L. REv. 913, 914 (1952). This may take the form of a requirements
contract, in which the supplier agrees to sell the buyer, and the buyer agrees to purchase,
all of the buyer's requirements of a product for a certain length of time. Ibid.
2. An intensive sales effort is often required for the distribution of mechanical and
electrical equipment Relatively detailed demonstration and installation may be necessary,
and special maintenance services are frequently required. Consequently, the exclusive
dealership may be essential to effective distribution of the manufacturer's goods. \rsaTxns,
PuBic REGULATIO.N OF CoT'arrrVn PRAcricEs 210-11 (1940). Moreover, its purpose
may be simply to reduce sales cost, or to insure maximum sales effort by dealers. Lockhart
& Sacks, supra note 1, at 921-22.
3. For the factors determining the effects on competition of such arrangements, see
Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 1, at 923-29.
4. An exclusive sales agency, by which a buyer obtains exclusive distribution rights
in a designated territory, is often very effective in eliminating competition at the buyer's
market level. However, these sales arrangements have be" generally upheld. See Com-
ment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Coutpelition, 58 YALe L.J. 1121, 1130-32
(1949).
5. Exclusive dealerships make access to the consumer market more difficult for the
new or small manufacturers who are the most common price cutters. A dealer handling
a -well-known brand is less likely to use price cutting as a means of competing with
other dealers. This is especially true where he receives an exclusive agency. See Dirw.A
& KA-H, FAIm ComprrnioN 199-201 (1954).
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contracts whenever their effect may be substantially to lessen competition.0
In the leading case of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United Statcs,1 the
Supreme Court condemned the employment of this device by the largest seller
in the industry 8 and apparently held that exclusive dealer contracts affecting
a substantial amount of business are illegal per se when utilized by a seller
who is a major factor in his marketY Recent cases have re-emphasized that
these arrangements are unlawful whenever there is a reasonable probability
of substantial injury to competition.1"
In United States v. Colgate," however, the Supreme Court held that a
manufacturer has the right to refuse to sell to anyone for any reason. The
scope of this rule has been severely limited in subsequent cases. A manu-
facturer cannot refuse to sell if its design is to create or maintain a monopoly.12
Nor can a manufacturer go beyond a mere refusal to sell and receive coopera-
tion from its dealers in reporting nonconformists. 18 But the Colgate doctrine
6. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandisc,
machinery, supplies or other commodities, ... on the condition, agreement or under-
standing that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller, where the effect . . .may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
§14 (1952).
7. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
8. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295 (1949).
9. Id. at 314. See United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal.
1951), aff'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952) ; Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors
of Federal Reserve System, 206 F.2d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 1953) (dictum).
10. E.g., Dictograph Products, Inc. v. FTC, 2d Cir., Dec. 15, 1954. See also Harley-
Davidson Motor Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) II 25,108 (FTC 1954);
Revlon Products Corp., CCH TRADEz REG. REP. (1954 Trade Cas.) ff 25,184 (FTC 1954).
11. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Defendant distributed circulars and letters urging its
dealers to adhere to uniform prices and stating that no sales would be made to those
who did not. Defendant uniformly refused to sell to offenders. Dismissing the indictment,
the court broadly affirmed the right to cease dealing with anyone. Furthermore, the
court stated that an individual may state in advance the circumstances trider which lie
will refuse to sell.
12. Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (refusal of newspaper to
sell advertising space to radio advertisers held an attempt to monopolize) ; Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (refusal to sell to
wholesaler held an attempt to monopolize film distribution); United States v. Klearflax
Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945) (refusal to deliver rugs to distributor
who had underbid defendant on a government contract held an attempt to monopolize).
See Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1134-36 (1949).
13. In FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), the Court condemned
defendant's distribution system and attempted to distinguish Colgate because of tie
methods Beech-Nut adopted to make its refusal to deal effective. However, there seeing
to be very little difference between the two plans. Several lower court decisions have
subsequently applied Beech-Nut. Hills Bros. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
270 U.S. 662 (1926); Q.R.S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1926); Toledo
Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. FTC, 11 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1926). Professor Chaffee has
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is still frequently cited and applied.14 And two recent decisions " indicate
that if a manufacturer establishes exclusive outlets by refusing to sell to
dealers handling competing products it can have such arrangements upheld,
although the effect on competition may be the same as that of exclusive dealer
contracts. Furthermore, even if exclusive dealer contracts are used, a private
party denied a franchise because he refuses to deal exclusively may be unable
to sue for treble damages. 16
In Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.,'7 the Fifth Circuit
applied .the Colgate doctrine and dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action under the antitrust laws. Plaintiff was
a distributor of Motorola's radio, television, and communication equip-
ment for several years prior to 1949. In that year Motorola in-
formed it that it would no longer be allowed to distribute Motorola com-
munication equipment and that its franchise to sell Motorola radio and tele-
vision receivers would not be renewed unless plaintiff agreed not to distribute
communication equipment manufactured by firms in competition with Motor-
stated that the Beech-Nut line of cases proscribes almost all effective methods of exercising
the right upheld in Colgate. Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HAv. L. Rzv. 945,
991 (1927). For similar views on the encroachments on Colgate, see Judge Frank's dissent-
ing opinion in Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 1S9 F.2d 913, 924
(1951); Comment, 58 Y.LE L.J. 1121, 1127-29 (1949); Timberg, Selection of Customners
in How To CompLY wiTH THE: AHTi, UST LAWS 117 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954).
The courts have almost consistently condemned refusals to sell which are the result of
group action. Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1136-40 (1949). The leading modern case
on group boycott is Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
A combination in the women's garment industry refused to sell to manufacturers and
retailers who dealt in designs copied from their members. The Supreme Court held that
the Federal Trade Commission was not in error in refusing to hear the evidence which
the combination offered to justify its action. See also Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948)
(dictum).
14. See Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1945) (soft drink bottler
refused to supply plaintiff unless plaintiff agreed to handle only Pepsi) ; Johnson v. J. H.
Yost Lumber Co., 117 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1941) (suppliers refused to sell to cut-rate
lumber dealer); Camfield Mfg. Co. v. McGraw Electric Co., 70 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del.
1947) (refusal to sell "Toastmaster" to distributors selling plaintiff's toaster).
In Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 189 F2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951),
the Second Circuit applied Colgate although there wras a contract between the distributor
and plaintiff in which the distributor agreed to control the wholesale price of
a certain whisky. The distributor evidently planned to refuse to sell to other
wholesalers not maintaining the suggested price, mid the court declared that the
distributor had the right to do so under Colgate. However, the court's statement was
mere dictum because it held that the price maintenance plan was exempt from the Sher-
man Act by virtue of the Miller-Tydings Amendment Id. at 916.
15. Leo J. M1eyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 75 S. Ct. 113 (1954) ; Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
16. Ibid. See text at notes 17-19.
17. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
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ola. Plaintiff rejected these conditions and sued Motorola to recover treble
damages for injury to its business resulting from the termination of its distribu-
tor contract. The court held that Motorola's refusal to continue business
relations with plaintiff except on the specified conditions was merely a refusal
to deal which was permissible under Colgate.'8 There was no exclusive
dealer contract subject to attack under the Clayton Act because there was no
contract at all; the previous contract between the parties had terminated, and
no new one had been entered into. Contracts with distributors in other areas
which prevented them from dealing with competitors of Motorola were held
not to have injured plaintiff and therefore they provided no ground for complaint
on its part.10 Thus, although Motorola employed exclusive dealer contracts
whenever it could persuade or coerce distributors to make them,20 plaintiff
was unable to recover simply because it made the mistake of suing before
submitting to defendant's demands. Presumably, if it had merely signed the
contract which Motorola had urged on it, plaintiff could then have recovered
for the injury to its business resulting from that contract.21
In Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp.,22  the Ninth
Circuit also dismissed a distributor's complaint, holding that the re-
fusal of a manufacturer to continue dealing with plaintiff because
plaintiff insisted on handling a competing line did not violate the Clay-
ton Act. Plaintiff argued that since Section 3 of the Clayton Act pro-
hibits certain exclusive dealer contracts, it was also a violation of the
Act to cancel a franchise for refusal to agree to or abide by such an
arrangement.23 The court cited no decisions, but, following the line of reason-
ing employed in Nelson, concluded that neither a private nor a government
action would be successful in such a situation. 21
These two cases demonstrate one of the weaknesses of the antitrust laws:
by merely prohibiting the contracts, combinations, and conspiracies by which
unreasonable effects on competition are engendered rather than the unreason-
able effects themselves, the laws are often unable to deal effectively with uni-
18. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 915-16 (5th Cir.
1952).
19. Id. at 915.
20. Id. at 913.
21. "There is a real difference between the act of refusing to deal and the execution
of a contract which prevents a person from dealing with another." Id. at 916. Tile
Court assumed that Motorola's contracts with other distributors violated § 3 of the
Clayton Act and gave no reason for denying recovery other than that no such contract
existed between plaintiff and Motorola. Id. at 915. But cf. Hudson Sales Corp. v. Wal-
drip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954).
22. 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 75 S. Ct. 113 (1954).
23. Opening Brief for Appellant, p. 4, Leo J. Meyberg Co. v. Eureka Williams Corp.,
215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1954).
24. The record in Meyberg gives no information of contracts with other dealers such
as existed in Nelson. Thus, the government may not have the basis for a successful
action against Eureka Williams under the Clayton Act, as it probably had against
Motorola. See 53 COLum. L. Rxv. 874, 876 (1953).
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lateral action by firms which have substantial but not monopoly power.P
However, sophisticated courts have pierced through form to substance and
manipulated the doctrines of combination and conspiracy when necessary to
effectuate the public policy in favor of competition."0 One of the leading
cases in this trend is Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States.- Interstate, a
motion picture exhibitor with substantial market power, wrote a form letter
to various distributors, demanding as a condition of its continued exhibition of
their films that the distributors impose certain arbitrary restrictions on the
exhibition of films by Interstate's competitors.28 Each distributor agreed to
follow Interstate's demands. The Supreme Court held that an express agree-
ment was not a prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy among the distributors 0
It pointed out that an unlawful conspiracy is often formed witlout simul-
taneous action or agreement by the conspirators,30 and held that it was
sufficient that the distributors adhered to Interstate's scheme knowing that
concerted action was planned and invited, and that such action would result
in restraint of trade.3 1 Thus, under the Sherman Act, a known plan and
an invitation (or coercion) to participate can provide the link between indi-
vidual conspirators, taking the place of a formal agreement.3
25. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORcEMENT OF THE FEDEAL
ANTITRUST LAWs 43 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941).
26. The doctrine of "conscious parallel action" has been developed by the courts to
strike down certain practices in the oligopolistic industries. This involves the inferring
of a "conspiracy" from apparently independent acts. The principle is not new. Cf. Eastern
States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914). However, it has been
greatly expanded in recent years. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781 (1946) ; FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). For the broadest application
of the doctrine, see Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 929 (1952). But cf. Theatre Enterprise, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
The courts have also found conspiracy between a parent corporation and its sub-
sidiaries, thus prohibiting many corporate activities formerly thought immune from the
Sherman Act. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941) ; Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110
(1948) ; United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1949). For a complete study of the doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy, see Com-
ment, 63 YALE L.J. 372 (1954).
In general, see United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180-81 (1911);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276-80 (1942); Timnken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-600 (1951).
27. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
28. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 203, 215-18, 230-31 (1939).
29.' Id. at 226.
30. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 408 (7th Cir. 1941); Marino v. United States,
91 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1937); McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128, 133 (8fl
Cir. 1937).
31. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 203, 226 (1939).
32. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
33. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 203, 227 (1939).
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Interstate provides an effective method of attacking many refusal-to-deal
situations.34 The manufacturer and his exclusive dealers can be charged with
participating in a nation-wide conspiracy to restrain trade in their industry by
constricting the market opportunities of competing producers and narrowing
the sources from which competing distributors can buy.85 When the manu-
facturer informs his distributors that he will no longer sell to anyone who
also distributes the goods of competing producers, he is inviting (or attempt-
ing to coerce) them to agree to boycott competing producers 30 in return for
his promise to refuse to sell to any dealer who is unwilling to cooperate.','
34. Of course, in many cases, this use of the Intcrstate formula would not he suffkient.
There will be instances where the refusal to deal is only an isolated busine.s practice,
generally because of a decline in sales of the manufacturer's product. InI other situatns,
the trier of fact might find that the dealer did not join in the common plan but exereisd
its own independent business judgment. Cf. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Filin
Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) ; Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber Co., 117 F.2d
53 (8th Cir. 1941); Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1946). See also
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 713-16, 723, 719 (1944),
a.firining 45 F. Supp. 387, 397, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). As a third stumbling block, the
court might find that the agreement does not unreasonably restrict competitiou. Cf. Hud-
son Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954).
35. In Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 165 (1941), the Su-
preme Court, in discussing the Guild's exclusive dealer plan of not selling to retailers who
handled copied garments, stated: "[I]t narrows the outlets to which garment and textile
manufacturers can sell and the sources from which retailers can buy."
The conspiracy need not be "nation-wide." Conspirators may be convicted of restrain-
ing any part of interstate commerce which can be regarded as an economic market. Indiana
Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279
(1934); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1947); Standard Oil
Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1949).
36. "Here we have in fact an agreement among the wholesalers through Soft-Lite
and an agreement among the retailers through Soft-Lite .... Each participant, of course,
understands that he is of a larger system. . . . Defendants call the favored retailers
'licensees.' When admitted to the privilege of purchasing Soft-Lite lenses they received
from Soft-Lite a document called a license. But Soft-Lite has no privilege to confer.
The right to buy Soft-Lites from those who own them is not within its gift ...
Without the boycott maintained by it, in concert with the wholesalers, against unlicensed
retailers, Soft-Lite's attempt to exercise this pretended power would have been a mere
theatrical gesture. The force which transferred the license from the stage to the market
place was the force of the boycott. And it is this very exertion of force by agreement
or combination against the freedom of trade which is outlawed by the Sherman Act."
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387, 397, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1942),
aff'd, 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944).
The right to select one's suppliers is just as fundamental as the right to select one's
customers. In Interstate a conspiracy was found when an exhibitor (retailer) refused to
deal with distributors (manufacturer-wholesalers) except on condition that the'distributors
(manufacturer-wholesalers) restrict their dealings with competitors of the exhibitor
(competing retailers). Similarly a conspiracy may be found when a manufacturer refuses
to deal with retailers except on condition that the retailers restrict their dealings with
competitors of the manufacturer.
37. The consideration for the dealer's agreement to handle exclusively the nanu-
facturer's product will vary. In some cases the manufacturer will agree to sell only
through exclusive dealers. In others lie will merely agree to supply his product to the
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Any dealer who then handles only the manufacturer's line knowingly partici-
pates in the plan and thus joins the conspiracy.38 Mere acquiescence in the
scheme is just as illegal as initiation of the plan.30 And economic coercion
is no defense to a charge of conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.40 Even
plaintiff's prior participation in the conspiracy will seldom prevent recovery
from the manufacturer and cooperating distributors.41
dealer. And in others he may grant the dealer the right to distribute his product
exclusively in a certain area. See Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors
in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayto; Act,
65 HARv. L REv. 913, 920-21 (1952). The effect of the arrangement on competition, and
therefore its legality, will vary with the consideration for the dealer's agreement. Id. at
923-29.
38. "That is true though the District Court found that in negotiating and entering
into the first agreements each appellee, other than Masonite, acted independently of the
others, negotiated only with Masonite, desired the agreement regardless of the action
that might be taken by any of the others, did not require as a condition of its acceptance
that Aasonite make such an agreement with any of the others, and had no discussions with
any of the others. It is not clear at what precise point of time each appellee became avare
of the fact that its contract was not an isolated transaction but part of a larger arrange-
ment. But it is clear that as the arrangement continued each became familiar with its
purpose and scope. Here as in Interstate Circuit, Inc., v. United States, . . . 'It was
enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors
gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.'" United States v. Masonite Corp.,
316 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1942). See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 142 (1948); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723
(1944); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393-94 (1948);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 203, 226-27 (1939).
39. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948). Cf. United
States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944).
40. Economic coercion is no defense in criminal law. See HALL, GE.NFU1AL PINCIPALS
oF CRmIrnAL LAw 411-15 (1947); M LER, CImIAL LAW 164-66 (1934). Nor is it
a defense in antitrust litigation. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 203, 230
(1939). In United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 297 (1948), the Supreme
Court, in finding a conspiracy, stated that all the manufacturers were forced to accept
the terms of the licensor or cease manufacture although several of the licensets were
opposed to the price limitations imposed on them. See also United States v. WValthamn
Watch Co., 47 F. Supp. 524, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Note, 54 COLUM. L REV. 110, 1123
(1954).
41. Although "pari delicto" is sometimes a good defense, it is barred where plaintiff
proves economic coercion or duress. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials
Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Ring v. Spina, 148 F2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945); Allgair v.
Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). In Ring v. Spina, supra,
the Second Circuit stated that victims and those actively engaged in promoting the
monopoly should be distinguished. However, it then suggested that even proof of economic
coercion may not be necessary for dealers in positions analogous to Nelson and Mfeyberg.
Ring v. Spina, .rtpra, at 653. Cf. Note, 38 MINx. L. Ra,. 883 (1954). But cf. Pennsyl-
vania Water & P. Co. v. Consolidated G.E.L. & P. Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953).
"Pari delicto" will also be an unsuccessful defense when the plaintiff's cause of action
arises after he leaves the illegal scheme. See, e.g., Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 101 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1939). Of course, damages will only be measured
from the time the plaintiff leaves the combination. For the history of the "pari delicto"
defense, see Lockhart, Violation of the Anti-trust Laws as a Defense it Civil Actions, 31
Mxx. L. REv. 507 (1947).
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In Nelson v. Motorola,42 plaintiff charged a conspiracy in violation of Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act as well as a violation of the Clayton Act. Nelson
alleged that the officers of Motorola had conspired among themselves and with
the corporate entity to restrain trade in Motorola communication equipment.
The court found that the acts of the officers were acts of the corporation and
rejected plaintiff's theory that a corporation can conspire with itself. It held
that two persons or entities were necessary to have a conspiracy and dis-
missed the charge because only one entity was involved in plaintiff's allega-
tions.43 However, the court stated that if Motorola's operations were carried
on by parent and subsidiary corporations, those separate corporate entities
could be found guilty of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.44 Since the nation-
wide conspiracy charge which Initerstate suggests would be brought against
the manufacturer and his exclusive dealers, Nelson supports the theory that
the Sherman Act can be used effectively against many refusal-to-deal situations.
Employment of the Interstate formula also eliminates another defect in the
Nelson complaint. The Nelson court stated that contracts with other distribu-
tors did not injure plaintiff.45 But if a nation-wide conspiracy were charged,
the injury to plaintiff would be clear. For then those contracts would be
viewed as part of an overall scheme by which plaintiff is restricted from the
possibility of increased income through the sale of competing goods. 40
After a conspiracy is established, the unreasonableness of the restriction on
competition must be shown to prove a violation of the Sherman Act.41 And
in a private suit the plaintiff must also demonstrate that he has been injured
42. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
43. Nelson Radio & Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir.
1952). See Marion County Co-op Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark.
1953). But cf. White Bear Theater Corp. v. State Theater Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.
1942); Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915). For a persuasive
argument that the court should have found an intracorporate conspiracy in Nelson, see
Comment, 63 YALE L.J. 372, 385-87 (1954).
44. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir.
1952) (dictum).
45. Id. at 915
46. See Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Deterinbninit
Whether Excltsive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 IHAv. L. Riw.
913, 922 (1952). Cf. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Frey & Son
v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 240 Fed. 114 (4th Cir. 1917).
47. Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Feddersen Motors,
Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125
Fed. 454 (8th Cir. 1903); United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn.
1951). See Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "Net" Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 313-37 (1954). See also Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) ; Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ;
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The "rule of reason"
requires consideration of all the factors and circumstances in any given situation. How-
ever, if the conspiracy is considered a group boycott, see text at note 36 supra, the burdeii
on plaintiff may not be so great. See Justice Reed's dictum in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948) (concerted refusals to deal are illegal per se);
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by the acts constituting the violation.48 Due to Standard Stations,"0 the
plaintiff has a lighter burden in proving the probability of a substantial lessening
of competition under the Clayton Act I0 rather than an unreasonable restraint
of trade under the Sherman ActY' Nevertheless, the allegation of a conspiracy
in violation of the Sherman Act has the advantage of avoiding the application
of the Colgate doctrine and of making the courts face the real issue involved,
the effect of the distribution method on competition.52
Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violalions of the Sherman Act, 10 GEO.
WA H. L. Rm. 302, 387 (1942) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts
to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Ificir. L. RE%. 1136-40, 1150-51 (1952). But
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